



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-788-64 12 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Evacuation of US Personnel (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 4 September 1964, subject as above, requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to appropriate US military courses of action which could be pursued to rescue the 25 Americans presently held by the rebel forces in Stanleyville, Republic of the Congo, and an evaluation of the probability of securing the rescue of the individuals unharmed.

2. Basically, two courses of action are available:

- a. The overt use of a joint task force in a parachute/air-landed assault operation, utilizing multiple drop sones and supported by tactical air, to seize and secure the Stanleyville airfield, rescue the US personnel, and withdraw the entire force. Additional details are contained in the Annex hereto.
- b. The covert use of military forces to effect a clandestine night parachute landing west of Stanleyville, infiltrate by rubber boat or foot to the US Consulate and/or other known locations of US personnel, overpower the guards, and move with the rescued personnel to a prearranged exfiltration area for pickup by helicopter or C-46 air commando aircraft.
- 3. Modifications to either course of action would be required dependent upon the latest enemy intelligence, the location and surveillance/guarding of the personnel to be rescued. US force availability, and the decision as to whether all or only part of the US personnel were to be rescued.

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GROUP 4

Commercial at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

* Attachment to JCS 2262/151

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- 4. Either an overt or covert operation has a reasonable chance of successfully rescuing the personnel unharmed, providing:
 - a. The precise location of the personnel to be rescued can be determined PRIOR to initiation of the operation.
 - b. The plan is NOT compromised and complete surprise is obtained.
 - c. The commander is authorized to use such force as is necessary to accomplish the mission.
- 5. Both of the courses of action in paragraph 2, above, might prove to be infeasible because locations of US personnel may not be known, because of the opposition of the Belgian Government due to anticipated reprisals against foreigners in the Stanleyville area, or because the element of surprise may be lost. Accordingly, a third course of action might be required which would provide for the capture of Stanleyville and its control long enough to transfer control to Congolese security forces and/or evacuate all foreign personnel. This course of action would probably require additional force.
- 6. From a military viewpoint, if a decision is made to employ US military forces to rescue the US personnel in Stanleyville:
 - a. The covert operation offers the best chance of successfully rescuing the US personnel unharmed.
 - b. The covert operation should be backed up by the prepositioning of the overt force for contingency employment, if required.
- 7. To preclude undue delay in implementation, if directed, immediate authorization to initiate detailed planning and dispatch of covert planners to the Congo is required.
 - 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
 - a. The broad course of action, envisioning the initial effort being conducted by covert means with the back-up overt force being pre-positioned and ready for contingency employment if required, be selected as the appropriate course of action, if US intervention is directed.





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- b. Authority be granted for the immediate dispatch of the covert planners to the Congo, if detailed planning is desired.
- c. Political coordination be accomplished with Government of Belgium officials and authorization be granted for on-the-scene military coordination between appropriate US and Belgian military personnel, if US intervention is directed.
- d. The above views be transmitted to the Department of State substantially as in the Appendix and Annex hereto.

For the Joint Chiefe of Staff:

SIGNED
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE Subject: Evacuation of US Personnel (U)

	1. !	The :	folla	owir	ng ir	ıformati	on is	pr	ovided	in re	espo	nse 1	to
you	ır re	eque	st tl	nat	the	Departm	ent o	f D	efense	make	an	evalu	uation
of	the	prol	blem	of	extr	icating	the	US :	person	nel pi	rese	ntly	held
bу	the	reb	els i	in S	Stanl	eyville.	•						

- 2. Basically two courses of action are available:
- a. The overt use of a Joint Task Force in a parachute/ airlanded assault operation, utilizing multiple drop zones and supported by tactical air, to seize and secure the Stanleyville airfield, rescue the US personnel and withdraw the entire force. Additional details are contained in the Annex hereto.
- b. The covert use of military forces to effect a clandestine night parachute landing west of Stanleyville, infiltrate by rubber boat or foot to the US Consulate and/ or other known location of US personnel, overpower the guards and move with the rescued personnel to a prearranged exfiltration area for pick-up by helicopter or C-46 air commando aircraft.
- 3. Modifications to either course of action would be required dependent upon the latest enemy intelligence, the location and surveillance/guarding of the personnel to be rescued, US force availability and the decision as to whether all or only part of the US personnel were to be rescued.
- 24 4. Either an overt or covert operation has a reasonable 25 chance of successfully rescuing the personnel unharmed 26 providing:

GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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a. The precise location of the personner to be rescued	1
can be determined PRIOR to initiation of the operation.	2
b. The plan is NOT compromised and complete surprise	3
is obtained.	4
c. The commander is authorized to use such force as	5
is necessary to accomplish the mission.	6
5. Both of the foregoing courses of action might prove to	7
be infeasible because locations of US personnel may not be	8
known, Decause of the opposition of the Felgian Government	9
due to anticopated reprisals against foreigners in the Stanley-	10
ville area, or because the element of suprise may be lost.	11
Accordingly, a third course of action might be required which	12
would provide for the capture of Stanleyville and its control	13
long enough to transfer control to Congolese security forces.	14
and/or evacuate all foreign personnel. This course of action	15
would probably require additional force.	16
6. From a military viewpoint, if a decision is made to	17
employ US military forces to rescue the US personnel in	18
Stanleyville:	19
a. The covert operation offers the best chance of	20
successfully rescuing the US personnel unharmed.	21
b. The covert operation should be backed up by the pre-	22
positioning of the overt force for contingency employment	23
if required.	24
7. To preclude delay in implementation, should such a	25
decision be made, it is necessary that detailed planning be	26
initiated immediately. This would require the dispatch to	27
Leopoldville, under cover, of covert officer planners from	28
USCINCMEAFSA.	29
8. If you desire the initiation of detailed planning, it	30
is requested that:	31
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a. Political coordination be accomplished with	1
Government of Belgium officials and authorization be	2
granted for on-the-scene military coordination between	3
appropriate US and Belgian military personnel, if US	L
intervention is directed.	5
b. Authority be granted for the immediate dispatch	6
of the covert planners to the Congo	7

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ANNEX TO AFFENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING THE TWO BASIC COURSES OF ACTION Overt Course of Operation


a. Employment of a Joint Task Force in a parachute/	1
airlanded assault operation, utilizing multiple drop zones	2
and supported by tactical air, to seize and secure the	3
Stanleyville airfield, rescue the US personnel and with-	4
draw the entire force.	5
b. The force would consist of 2 airborne rifle	6
companies, 8 tactical fighter aircraft supported by KC135	7
tanker aircraft as required and 17 C-130E aircraft.	8
c. The operation could be initiated in Stanleyville	9
approximately 71 hours after ordered executed. This	10
assumes detailed planning had been completed.	11
d. Advantages and disadvantages:	12
(1) The operation would show, in an area where	13
turmoil will probably exist for many years to come, that	14
the United States does not intend to permit its citizens	15
legitimately in a country to be harassed, imprisoned,	16
or otherwise molested.	17
(2) There are various numbers of non-Congolese	18
reported to be in Stanleyville with one figure being as	19
high as four to five hundred. The rescue of US	20
personnel alone, assuming there are other non-Congolese	21
who would like to get out, could well react unfavorably	22
to the general interests of the United States and her	23
relationships with countries of western Europe and	24
Africa.	25
(3) The overt operation has every promise of re-	26
capturing the city and making it feasible to secure it	27
and return it to Congolese governmental control. This	28

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


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would, however, constitute US military involvement in	1
Congolese internal affairs versus a rescue operation.	2
(4) Since Stanleyville has apparently become the	3
capital of the rebellious-communist movement, its	4
reduction and pacification would constitute a serious	5
setback to the general movement and, in net effect,	6
would probably be more useful at this time than the	7
capture of the town of Uvira which is the rebel-	8
communist supply base.	9
Covert Course of Operation	10
a. Employment of military forces to effect a clandestine	11
night parachute landing west of Stanleyville, infiltrate	12
by rubber boat or foot to the US Consulate and/or other	13
known locations of US personnel, overpower the guards and	14
move with the rescued personnel to a prearranged exfil-	15
tration area for pick-up by helicopter or C-46 air	16
commando aircraft.	17
b. The force would consist of selected and tailored	18
US Army elements (approximate strength 75), US Air Force	19
Special Air Warfare detachments (approximate strength 25),	20
2 C-46 aircraft, 3 HU-1D helicopters and 3 H-34 helicopters.	. 21
c. The operation could be conducted in Stanleyville	22
beginning 11 days after ordered executed. This also assumes	323
detailed planning had been completed.	24
d. Advantages and disadvantages:	25
(1) It involves fewer complications than does the	26
overt operation.	27
(2) Casualties should be minimized and the	28
possibility exists that the mission could be accomplished	d29
without any casualties.	30
(3) Explanations to other countries as to why their	31
people were not also liberated would be unnecessary.	32

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(4) The covert operation would appear to have a	1
greater chance of successfully accomplishing the	2
mission in view of the rebels announced intention of	3
taking reprisal action against US personnel if the "US	4
imperialist" continued to intervene in Congolese affairs.	5

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
ENCLOSURE B

DISCUSSION

1. Overt military operations would require the commitment	1
of a Joint Task Force (JTF) consisting primarily of two	2
rifle companies, eight tactical fighter aircraft supported	3
by KCl35 tanker aircraft as required and 17 Cl30E aircraft.	4
The JTF would conduct a parachute/airlanded assault, on	5
multiple drop zones and supported by tactical air, to seize	6
and secure the Stanleyville airfield, rescue the US personnel	7
and withdraw the entire force. The operation could be	8
initiated in Stanleyville 70 hours and 50 minutes after	9
ordered executed provided detailed planning had been completed.	10
a. Advantages and disadvantages:	11
(1) The operation would show, in an area where	12
turmoil will probably exist for many years to come, that	13
the United States does not intend to permit its citizens	14
legitimately in a country to be harassed, imprisoned,	15
or otherwise molested.	16
(2) There are various numbers of non-Congolese reported	17
to be in Stanleyville with one figure being as high as	18
four to five hundred. The rescue of US personnel alone,	19
assuming there are other non-Congolese who would like	20
to get out, could well react unfavorably to the general	21
interests of the United States and her relationships	55
with countries of western Europe and Africa.	23
(3) The overt operation has every promise of recapturing	g24
the city and making it feasible to secure it and return	25
it to Congolese governmental control. This would, how-	26
ever, constitute US military involvement in Congolese	27
internal affairs versus a rescue operation.	28

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(4) Since Stanleyville has apparently become the	1
capital of the rebellious-communist movement, its	2
reduction and pacification would constitute a serious	3
setback to the general movement and, in net effect,	4
would probably be more useful at this time than the	5
capture of the town of Uvira which is the rebel-	6
communist supply base.	7
2. Covert operations utilizing military forces would require	8
the commitment of a Joint Task Force consisting of selected and	9
tailored US Army elements (approximate strength 75), US Air	10
Force Special Air Warfare detachments (approximate strength 25),	,11
two C-46 aircraft, three HU-1D helicopters and three H-34	12
helicopters. The JTF would effect a clandestine night	13
parachute landing west of Stanleyville, infiltrate by rubber	14
boat or foot to the US consulate and/or other known locations	15
of US personnel, overpower the guards and move with the	16
rescued personnel to a prearranged exfiltration area for	17
pick-up by helicopter or C-46 air commando aircraft. This	18
operation could be conducted in Stanleyville beginning 264	19
hours after ordered executed provided detailed planning had	20
been completed.	21
a. Advantages and disadvantages:	22
(1) It involves fewer complications than does the	23
overt operation.	24
(2) Casualties should be minimized and the possibility	25
exists that the mission could be accomplished without	26
any casualties.	27
(3) Explanations to other countries as to why their	28
people were not also liberated would be unnecessary.	29
(4) The covert operation would appear to have a	30
greater chance of successfully accomplishing the mission	31
in view of the rebels announced intention of taking re-	32
prisal action against US personnel if the "US	33
imperialists" continued to intervene in Congolese affairs	.34

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3. If a decision is reached to undertake the recovery of the	_
US personnel in Stanleyville by covert methods, consideration	2
should be given to the next course of action should the covert	3
undertaking fail. If the covert undertaking should fail, the	4
rebels in Stanleyville would know that the US instigated the	5
effort and would expand and exploit it for propaganda purposes	6
to the maximum. Therefore, it is believed that the overt opera-	7
tion should be laid on as a backup with all necessary forces	8
being placed secretly at their staging bases prepared to move	9
rapidly to Stanleyville and conduct the overt operation.	10
4. Either an overt or covert operation has a reasonable	11
change of successfully rescuing the personnel unharmed	12
providing:	13
a. The precise location of the personnel to be rescued	14
can be determined PRIOR to initiation of the operation.	15
b. The plan is NOT compromised and complete surprise	16
is obtained.	17
c. The commander is authorized to use such force as is	148
necessary to accomplish the mission.	19

5. Both of the foregoing courses of action might prove to 20 be infeasible because locations of US personnel may not be 21 known, because of the opposition of the Belgian Government due 22 to anticipated reprisals against foreigners in the Stanleyville 23 area or because the element of surprise may be lost. Accord-24 ingly, a third course of action might be required which would 25 provide for the capture of Stanleyville and its control long 26 enough to transfer control to Congolese security forces and/or 27 evacuate all foreign personnel. This course of action would 28 probably require additional force. 29

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6. Additional discussion is contained in CINCSTRIKE/	1
USCINCMEAFSA message, STRJ5 594/64, DTG 072130Z September	2
1964.*	-

* On file in Joint Secretariat

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